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PREFAQE.
The Suspension of the Power of Alienation and the result
of the suspehsion of the power of aliemation, popularly known as a
perpetuity, have for centuries commanded the alienation of legal
minds. The experiences of men and nations have -?emonstrated that
the circulation of currency and property among the inhabintants
of a state or country wit'. the least possible number of restrictiogs
consis:tent with a wise public policy, is one of the most potent
factors in advancing the grade of intelligence and promoting the
cor mercial welfare of the people. In countries where position in
society is regulat.d by the caste system, the main desire of those
of royal blood is to have their estates continue in the posssesion
of their descend1ants throughout all time, if possible, and to ac-
complish their purposes, they, realizing the probability of the
profligacy of futuare generations and desiring to annihilate the
possibility of prospective poverty, endeavored to tie up their
estates by suspen-ling the absolute rower of alienation for long
periods. The la,,,s ofj' geniture and estates tail were their
valuable and necessary assistants, and the equilibrium of their
social sy~tem was maintained bv them, conscientiously perhaps,
but with immeasurable injustice to their fellow men.
With the increase of civil li"-erty the strength of the bul-
warks of the caste system and its concot itants riminished, anJ the
lower olassos Of so,itY were reliavod of many of the irksnme
burd.ns which had bein hraped upon them by the ,,realthier po:ition
of the pcopI4. Tho rigors of the feudal 3ystocto so :."artiliar to
st;dt,,nts of English Law anfd history, nu,.d not ho rehoar3ed bore,
but imrposinp and formidablo as was that u'ztIm, oppressing the
poor beyond thy wa-rrant of cit.-her nture or necessity, an; sus-
taining the cupidit, of avaricious r,.en, it wa8 not inulnerab!(e
to the cor-tinun:4a canonadinp of the strong andft ri-Lteous principle,:
of lib, 'ty; and were it not for the pon of the ).itorian we
could almost, cor.vir.c3 ourselves tl±t it naror existod. In tl. e
preswt trea*1ioe I sholl endeavor to vive a brief and concis,)
history of the "rule agninut parpatuitios" with e':pecial referenr'e
to .w Yo)rk cases and sta utes, and incidentiiAly I shl;.l notice
the condition of th Iaw in o',Icr State3.
,o apology is offered for the writor's vie',-s and opinions
as to cihzt C anios 8hoL1d bQ. mara1 in the present state of the law
in orw Y rk, as none is corsideryd neccsziary 1)eyond a statenont
o, xi...trig .o which should bO ror,edied.
-ay 9 l93. Rdward J. A. Prooks.
CHAPTER I .
The Power of Alienation.
Of all human riphts there are few, if any, which are more
ancient than the right to convey one's title to property, real
every
and personal; but this rip-ht, like most Aother right, has been sub-
or,,inated to the public policy of nations as expressed or carried
out in their la-s and customs. It has been tThe policy of England
and the United States to gradually remove restrictions upon the
power of alienation, in order that the welfare of the general
public should be conserved and the occurrence of hardships ren-
dered as improhable as human wisdom can make them. Thus, at the
real
cormon law married women could not alien theirAproperty, as their
marriage vested the title to it in their husbands, but at the
present time a married woman has the title to her real property
anr personal property and may dispose of the same by gift, grant,
assignment or devise, the same as if she were unmarried. ( Laws
N.Y. 1362, ch. 172; 8 ed. R.S. vol. 4, page 2603, sec. 3;
Draper v. Steuvenal, 35 N.Y. 507; Gage v. Daughy, 34, N.Y. 293.)
Under the feudal system as it formerly existed in England
tenant in tail was restrained from conveyin r his estate, but in
the reign of Edward I'. it was decided in Taltqrum's case that
where a tenant in tail s-ffered a common recovery, the estate-
tail would be destroyed thereby. During the reign of Honry VIII
I
laws were passed permitting a tenant in tail to mkke certain
leases that were not prejudicidl to the issue, and also making a
fine levied by the tenant a total bar to the continuamce of the
estates. ( 32 Her-ry VIII, ch. 28, oh. 35; Blackstone's Com. 117-8;
Chase's Ed. Black. 300-1)
At the present time an estate tail -;.a.y be aliened by the
tenant in tail both in England and in the United States by deed.
(3&4 Williams IV, ch. 74; Washburn on heal Prop. vol. 1, p. 11;
4th, Ed.) In New York state ever 4 estate which would at common law
have been adjudged a fee tail Jis converted by statute into a fee
simple, in case there is a valid zea limited upon it; but
if there is no such remainder, such an estate is held to be a fee
simple absolute. (8Ed. R.S. vol. IV, page 2431, see. 3, 1 R.L.
page 52, sec. 1; Nellis v. Nellis, 99 N.Y. 511.) One rule of
estates tail in their halcyon days was that the lord of the fee,
the owner of the reversion 'A-l, could not convey his interest in
the estate without the consent of the tenant. This rule and the
one preventing the tenant from conveying went a great ways in
protecting the ri Lts of the respe-!tive parties. It was well to
reiider the assent of the tenant necessary to the vailaity of a
transfer by the owner of the reversion of his interest in the
lands, in order that he miF!,t not be compelled to serve under a
lord whom he disliked. It was equally as well to make the lord's
consent requisite to a valid conveyance of the tenant's interest,
because the great land owners of EnFlan-j chose such tenamts as
would make valiant soldiers and defenders of their vast estates,
consequently, it would injure them greatly, if the tenant should
convey his estates to a person who possessed no military prowess.
BY the rule under consideration the lord of the estates was given
an opportunity to estimate the martial aility of a prospective
tenant and thas protect his irterests. But as the vears accumnulo
ated and the couantry settled down to enjoy an era of peace and
cormercial prosperity, the reason for these rules disappeared,
and the rules themselves were soon after consigned to a state
of innocuous desuetude by the willing hands of parliament and the
judiciary. (2 Blackstone 57; Chase's Ed. Black 252)434-5 ) When
a tenant gave his consent to a chanfe in the o-nership of the
lands he attorned to the new owner, that is, he acknowledged
himself to be the vassal of the grantee of the lands; but if the
tenant refused to attorn to the rrantee, the conveyance was void.
The statutes- by means of which the rigors of the ancient laws
were relaxed began with the Itatute of Westminster 2 h1 , which
allowed a man to aharge debts upon his lands to the extent of
one half the value of the same; and under the statute de mnrca-
toribus the whole estate might be charred and levied upon and
sold under execution. From this time 1235, the restraints upon
alienation were gradually eliminated by judicial legislation.
The statute bf Westminster II, 3 Edw. I, was oriuinally designed
to prevent the tenants in tail from alienating their estates and
thus barring the entail. Such alienations coula only be validly
made by the tenant after issue was born, but when that condition
was f1lfilled', an alienation b' the tenant barred not only his
own heir3, but cut off the reversion which previously e,-istcd in
the grantor. It is natural, therefor (2, that the lords end barons
looked upon such alienations with disfavor and apprehension, and
their sentiments became crystallized in the statute, commonly
known as the Statute De Donis Conditionalibus. When this
statute came before the courts for construction, the latter being
desirous of promulrating and extending the freedom of convevanciwi,
invented fictitious skits, by means of which t;-ic. force and power,
as well as the purposes of the statute were rendered ineffectual.
The great landowners percei-rinp the futilit v of trying to cut off
the puwrers of alienation instituted a system of fines for aliena-
ting, and managed by this means to secure a profitable source of'
rev3nue. The fine had to be paid by the purcl aser.
Black stone tells us that out of the statute of Westminster
the second came the system of estates tail. Prior to the passage
of that statute when a grant -Vas made to a man and the heirs of
his !body, the tenant could convey absolutely al'ter the birth of
an heir; bu the courts in construsing the statute , declared
that the tenant in such a Frant -1id not take a fee simple condi-
tioned on t1he birth of issue, as wns the ease before the passage
of the statute, but that the estate consisted of tvo parts, viz.,
a life estate in the tenant, and a remairder to his ,eirs, or
5upon a failure of' heirs, the estate reverted to fhe donor. This
new species of est: te came to be known as an estate ir fee tail.
(2 BI. C"omi. 112, Chase's rd. 297?)
The tenant at first was unr ble to alien his estate so as to
bar the issue and the reversioner'; but as has been previously
stated, the fetters which this statute (de donis) placed upon the
tenant were soon removed by ingenious methods which emanated from
the minds of those high in a'ithority. The reigning sovereirn
desired to have estates change ownership with but little restric-
tion, for such changes tended to weaken thea power of the lords or
feudal ,arons. The latter naturally resisted every attempt made
against their land system; hut grad ially their power and influ-
ence lessened as the facilities for ;.onve'Ting estates increased,
until at the present time alienation is as -ree in England as it
may well be and continue consistent with an enlightened public
policy. At common law the decds of married women were vtdable,
as were also those of inants, confirmed drunkards and idiotso.
This rule of lawv has only been chanved by the statutes in this
countrr with regard to married Women, who now hold their real
estate in nearly all of the states, as if they were unmarried. In
the cases of conveyances by persons under a disability, as in-
fancy, idiocy eta., if the person fail to repudiate the conveyance
within a reasonable time af'ter the removal of the disability, he
will be held to ',ave ratified the conveyance. In case the con-
veyance is rescifided equity will compel the Frantor to restore
to the grantee 'he consideration, unless the circumstan-es are
such that the consideration has passed out of the possession of
the grantor and could not be reproduced by him without Freat hard-
ship. If, however, the re-cinding party is so Ctuated timt he
is able to put the grantee in statu quo, the court will demand
that he do so in accordanc e with that fundamental rlaxim of equity,
that " he, who seeks equity, must do equity." Under the laws
relating to homestaads the rule in many states is that a husband
cannot alien any property belonging to him to which the homestead
right attaches unless he gains the written consent of his wife
and incorporates it into the deed of conveyance. Her signature
and acknowledgement is sufficient to satisft'y the requirements of
these statutes, in the majoritv of the states. In Illinois it is
not enough to have the fact of release of the homestead right
stated in the body of the deed or mortgage, but it must also
appear in the acknowlddgemert of the instrument. (Connor v.
Nichols 31 Ill. 148; Boyd v. Cudderback, id. 113;Thurston v.
Boyden, id. 20C) For a complete statement of ti e rules of the
various st.tis with regard to"how far homestead riFhts prevent
alienation," see Wash, urn on Real Prop. 5th, ed. vol. 1, pares 4,8
456 inclusive- )
Having discussed briefly the restraints put uron alienation
by the operation of law, the next topic in order is restraints
upon alienation resulting from the acts of individuals; and at this
point we come to the investigation of the theme of these commentarie,
C H A P T E R II
P E R P E T U I T I E
A perpetuity is a suspension of the absolute power of alien-
ation for a period longer than that which the law allows.(, CArthur
V. Scott, 113 N.S. 382; Lewis on Perp. 164, Rand on Perp. 48.)
The statute says that the"power of alienation is suspended, when
there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute fee in possess-
ion can be conveyed." The same section prevents any doubts fro-
arisiC as to what will be the status of the estate or estates
which are to coinnee in future and which suspend the absolute
power of alienation for a time longer than that prescribed in the
two following sections, it declares them to be"void." It will be
remlembered thet' at common law the absolute power of alienation
might be suspended for any number of lives in being ant. twenty
one years thereafter; New Yor - and a Freat many of the states
have limited the number of lives to two, with the single exception
that " a contingent remainder in fee may be created on a prior
remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the persons to
whom the first remainder is limited, shall die under the age of
twenty-one years, or upon any other contingency by which the
estate of such persons may be determined before they attain their
full age." (N.Y.R.S. vol. iv, page 2432 sec. 14 to 16 inclu3ive;
8It has been settled in this state that even thourh it is
possible for ti e suspension of tLe power to alienate to end
during the prescribed period, two lives in being and twenty-one
years thereafter, if there is any way by which it migrht be made
to extend beyond that time, it violates tle statute and the lim-
itation is void. However, where there are alternative devises,
the one to take effect in case the other dfoes not, and the one
which -loes take effect is a valid one. it will be sustained even
though its alternate could not have been in consequence of its -
legal 3xternsion of the period of suspension. (S, ettle7 v. Smith
41 N.Y. 328. hee.v. Lea 2 How. Prac.(N.S.) 76; Fowler v. Ingersoll,
127 N.Y. 472.) Where there are various provisions in a will
some of which are valid and others invalid, if it is posifble
to separate the valid portion from that which is void and enforce
it without doinr violence to the intention of the testator, the
courts will do so.
A testator directed in his will that his executrices should
convert his real estate into personalty within ten years after the
death of his widow. During the life of the latter the executrices
were to receive the rents and profits of the estate and apply
them to the use of the widow and themselves or the survivor of
them. After the death of the widow and until the conversion of
the real property into money the executrices were to -pnly the
income to their own use. Upon the sale of the property the pro-
ceeds were to be divided into four equal parts and distributed
as follows: One part to each of the two executrices, and the
remaininfr two parts were to be retained by the execut-ices as
trustees for the purpose of payirip the income thereof to the
other da- ghters of the testator during their lives, and at the
death of either, the principal, of which she had been receiving
the interest, should Vo to her heirs. Anaction was brought by
ths daghters to whom the life interests had been given to have
partition of their fathers estate, an,. it was held that the trust
for the li;'e of the widow was valid and could be sustained, but
the stat tte forbade the limiting of a trust which suspended the
power 9f alienationto a definite nutber of years, however short,
therefore, the testator died intestate as to all of his property
except the life estate given to the widow. (Underwood v. Curtis,
127 N.Y., 523; Savage v. Burnham 17 N.Y. 561, Manice v. Manice
43 N.Y. 303 ) In the case last cited a large number of interesti x"
que.,tions were inv61ved and a careful consideration of a few of
them will doubtless be profitable. J7ere the testator created a
trust to continue during the life of his wife. At her death the
residuary estate was to be di-ided into twelve equal parts and
distributed among gpe.'ified beneficiaries in stated proportions,
as follows; three twelfths to each of two sons and two twelfths
to be invested for the use and benefit of each of three daughters.
It was contended that these interests in the residuary estate
would not vest until the widow had died and the property had been
converted into money and the various shares asaert.ined, also
that during this period subsequent to the death of the wife and
prior to the final distribution of the shares the power of alien-
ation would be suspended illegally, as the time would not be
measured by human lives and might exceed more lv-)s than the
statute allowed. The will directed that these shares should be
ascertained by the trustees named therein and that th r should
make the distribution. It is obvious that if the trust term we,
really intended to continue during the life of the wife and up to
the time of the distribution of the shares that the contention of
the contestants of the will would have been unanswerable, but the
court declared that it was unable to find in any of the provisions
of the will any expression of such an intention, and that in such
a case it would not impute to the testator an illegal intention,
such as would be necessary to support the position taken by the
contestants. The court cited the following authorities in sup-
port of the view which it announced; Roper on Legacies, 5 A 1, 8
ed.; Pearson v. Lane, 17 Ves. 101; Collin v. Collin, 1 Barb. ch.,
630; Clason v. Clason, 61Pa ge 541; S.C., 18 Wend., 369; Haydon
v. Rose, L.R. 10 Eq. Cas., 224; Dubois v. Ray, 35 N.Y., 165,167,
175; eilly v. Fowler, Wilmot's Opinions, 293. Tucker v. Tucker,
1 Seld., 408; Post v. Hover, 33 N.Y., 301. In construeing the
will the court held ,hat the trust term was to last only during
the life of the wife, and that at 'her death the beneficiaries
took vested interests in their respective shares. These interests
being alienable the absolute power of selling was only suspended
during the continuance of the widow's lifc- and was such a
suspension as the law allows. The court placed considerable
stress upon the absence from the will of any clause providing for
the ownership of the shares during the peri-d which would naturall.
come between the death of the widow an.-I the final distribution of
the shares, and reasons from that fact that the testetor evidently
intended the ownership to be in the persons specified as legatees
from the time of such death.
This case is easily distinguished from the later case of
Underwood v Ourtis, 127 N.Y. 523, because in the latter case
there -as no doubt that a trust was created to run during the
life of the widow and for not more than ten years after her demise.
It nmy be said that the court might have held the trust to ter-
minate at the death of the widow, and that title immediately vested
in the beneficiaries leaving no title ii the truste-es, but simply
a power to ascertain the shares of the resnective parties and
distribute the same within the time specified. This however, coul-
not be done in view of the language of the will, which expressed
the testator's designs so clearly that it aas practically im-
possible to place a construction upon them different from the one
given to them in that case -y the court; and where the intention
is clear and apparent the court is bound to take the languare as
it finds it. (Elwin v. Elwin 8 Ves. 547; Schooler on Wills, p.
501, sec.468; 2 Jarmon on Wills (Uth, ed.) 773 sec. 16, Christie
v. Phjyfe, 19, il.'Y. 348.)
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A case of sonsiderable importance is that of Genet v. Hunt
113 N.Y. 158, there a feme sole in c ontemplttion of marriage
executed a trust deed, by which she gave all of her real and
personal property to certain persons to holei the legal title to
the same. and apply the income as it a,crued to the use of the
grantor during her life. The ri'ht to dispose of the property
by will was reserved by the Franto_'. The marriage occurred, and
after the lapse of several years, the grantor died leaving two
children her surviving. During the coverture she had executed
a will by which the trust property was given to her executors to
hold in trust for the benefit of the two children, and apply the
income to their maintenance. Upolft the death of either of the
children, the survivor was to receive the entire income for life,
while the principal was to be given to his heirs and next of kin.
The validity of the devise was attacked on the ground thd the
absolute power of alienation was suspended for more than txwo lives
in being. The court -sustained the attack and based its conclu-
sion on the following findirgs. It declared tkat the trust
deed executed prior to the coverture created a valid trust, and thv
the property conveyed by it had gone from the grantor so coinplet -
ly that her power to sell it during her life was extinguished.
The court also held that the reservation of the jus disponendi
was insufficient to prevent the suspension of the riFht to alien-
ate. It further found that trusts created by the will were to
continue through the two lives of the beneficiaries, and that,
consequently, the absolute power of alienation would be suspended
during three lives, if the prouisions of the will were perritted
to have the effect intended by the testatrix. Such a term being
manifestly illegal, the provisions of the will which created it
were held to be void and of no effect.
Testators frequently frustrated their on plans and purposes
by their inaptitude in endeavoring to express their wants and
wishes on paper. No questions are .-ore perpl3xing to the courts,
nor is there any species of legal problems more munerouB than
those relating to wills. It has been tie aiF7 of the courts from
time inemorial to carry out the intentions of testators as far
as would be consistent witl the existing rules of Taw. Courts
have always regarded testators as protegees, and in their endeauors
to ascertain the intentions of the makers of wills have frequent-
ly relaxed the rigor of legal rules, and guided only by the "pole
star" have succeeded in 7  an elaborate maze of com-
plicated decisions. In early common law times a fee could not
be linited upon a fXe, nor a remainder limited upon a life estate
in a term of years, nor an estate made to commence in the future
without a precedent estate to support it, by persons who desired
to create such estates by gift, grant, or livery of seizin but
they could be created by the same persons by executory devise or
will.
The reason for this is found in the fact that not infrequent-
ly teststors found themselves almost at the verge of the Frave
witha their property not yet willed and being ph'jsically and
mentally debilitated, wills often hat, to be written under cir-
cumstances not favorable for an accurate and comprehensive
execution of the same. These facts the courts took cognizance of
and allowed for in construing wills; all of them tried to effect-
uate the purposes of the testators whenever and wherever possible,
but there has for centuries been one particular ravine which the
courts have seldom tried and even less frequently succeeded in
crossing, namely, that of perpetuities. The English Parliament
and some of the state legislatures have permitted the creation
of perpetuities in favor of certain charitable and relipious
corporations, but as between private natural pers rns such a rule
does not now obtain in England or America.
Accumulations of the income of real estate may be arranged
for by a testator, but the accumulationsmust be made for a period
not longer than the minority or minorities of the beneficiary or
beneficiaries for whom they are intended. If they are made to
conmence at the time of the creation of the estate, they can only
apply to persons then in beinr; but, if the accumulations are not
to begin at the time of the creation o, the estate, they must com-
mence "within the time permitted for the vesting of future estates
and during the minorities of the persons for whose benefit they
are directed, and shall terminate at the expiration of such mi-
nority." Any accumulation that may be directed which in any way
violates the statute is invalid. R.S. ?art II, ch I, sec. 54 and 37.
The only express trusts that can be legally created arthe
following; "to sell lands for th, enefit of creditors; to 'sell,
mortgaFge or lease lands for the benefit of legatees or for the
purpose of satisfying any charge thereon; to receive the rents
and profis of lands and apply them to the use of any person,
during the life of such person, or for any shorter term, subject
to the rules prescribed in the first article of this title; (and)
to receive the rents and profits of lands and to accumulate the
same, for the purposes and within the limits prescribed in the
first article of this act." (N.Y.R.s. (3th, ed.) page 2437, sec.55)
PRy the courts of N-w York state and a majority of the other
states of the Union, it is hield that the absolute power of alien-
ation shall not be suspended for any period not measured by lives
in being, making the single excepti-,n which the statute allows
in the case of the limitat(on of a contingent remainder in fee
on a prior remainder in fee; that these holdings are in accor-
dance with the terms of the various statutes which they constrwe
is not disputed, but that there is a need for remedial legisla-
tion with respect to those statutes is is a fact which
is apparent to any one who has familiarized himself with the
d',cisions. In the case of Cruikshank v. i-ome of the Friendless,
113,. N.{. 337, the testator left property to be sed for the
establishment and endowment of a charitable instituti6n, which he"-
directed his executors to form and have the same incorporated by
the legislature within ten years after his death. The court held
that this provision -as invalid and that the residuary estate,
for "ich it was, should go to the legatees specified by the tes-
tator to take it in case his other provision should be held in-
valid. Here, it was said, the legislature might refuse to incor-
porate the society proposed by the testator and a perpetuity would
be created. But where a decedent left a will directing his
executors to pay the income of his estate to his wife during her
life and at her death to divide the principal into eight parts,
four of such parts to be given to certain religious associations
not yet incorporated, it was held that the association could take
at the time their interests were to vest, i.e., at the death of
the widow, provided that they were incorporated during the widow's
life. (Shipman v. Rollins, 98 N.Y. 311.) A similar case is that
of Burrill v. Boardman, 43 N.Y. 254, where a testator bequeathed
the residue of his estate to trustees, for the purpose of founding
a hospital within two years after his decth, provided that two
persons named in the will lived that long. The court concluded
that the words "within two years " were unnecessary, and held
that the fzture corporation could take if created by an act of
the legislature during the two lives named in the will.
A: illustrating the rule that the suspensicn of the absolute
powver of alienation is void if by any possibility such suspension
reight exceed the statutory period, see the cases of Schottler v.
Smith, 41 N.Y. 32 and Underwood v. Curtis, 127 N.Y. 523. )
In the case of Booth et al v. Baptist Dhurch, 126 N.Y. 215,
a devise was made to trustees to rtilize for the purpo of~an
asylum, to be under the control of a corporation not yet in esse.
The trustees were directed to secure the incprporation of the
asylum management and they obtained the passage of an act incor-
porating the same within four months after the testator's decease.
The decision of the court in the case was against the vali-iitV
of the provisions of the will which related to the asylum, be-
cause of the absence of the measuring lives, and once aga in ws
the high and noble purpose of a generous man frustrated by the
merciless power of tl e law. His vain endeavor to institute and
establish a place where the homeless might receive shelter and
nourishment ia s sad commentary on the humanitarian sentiments
of the present generation. That the courts of justice should be
compelled to lend their assistance to avaricious in- ividuals
whose pernicious energies are directed toward nullification of
A,
the liberal gifts of benevolent relatives to associatilnsincor-
porated 4.or the purpose of lessening in some degree the suff'erinps
of humanity, is a state of affairs which reflects discredit upon
our legislators, whose main ,iork should be the production and
passage of meaisures calculated to benefit their constituents.
Ahy should the arbitrary rule of our statute That the absolute
power of alienation shall not be suspended .k for aen longer period
than two lives in beinr, and in one case twerty-one years there-
after, be construed so strictly as to prevent tne pood intentirns
of testators and Frantors from beinr carried into effect? I am
free to admit th:t it is necessary to have a rule ;vith which to
regulate dispositions of property, and, I m also ready and willing
to concede that perpetuities are deleterious in their effects
upon finance and society, lut, notwithstanding those concessions
I maintain that the doctrine that obtains in our courts to the
effect that the absolute power of alienation may not be suspended
for any whatever not measured by lives in being, is a Dlemish
upon the fair records of our jurisprudence, and is a powerful
imlpediment to the accomplishment of humane anticipations and to
the progress of the spirit of fraternity. The courts are not to
be censured Aecause of the existence of the statute as it now
stands, and has stood for over a century, nor are they to be
blaned for construing it according to what they believe to be its
spirit, still the deplorable realities of boththe statute and its
construction remain as accusatory evidences of the undesira' le,
and I ray add unjustifiable, disregard of the benevolent inten-
tions of testators, who, through partial or complete ignorance of
the statutory requirements and the holdings of the courts with
reference to the dd4ositions of estates, have unwittir,-ly the
error of attemptiiig -o suspend the absolute of alienation of a
part or all of their property for a period of time measured by
sonethijng other than a lit> or lives in being. Under th3 present
state of the law the designs of all such teu,;tators, no matter
how philanthropic they may be, fall to the ground in consequence
of their failure to receive legal sanction. Th- t th2 rirht to
sell property may, under our existing laws be suspended foT, terms
which extend to t'ifty and even sixty years, provided tho life or
lives upon which the estate depends, continue that long, cannot :e
controverted, yet, while tht is a fact, persons are prohibited
from disposing of their pi'operty in such a .,ay as to put the power
of alienation in abeyance for any specific number of years, how-
ever short. If our public policy will not be impaired when an
estate is created in such a v-ay that its continuity is dependent
upon a life or lives in being, but which ciocumstances nermit
to rur -or fifty years or more titU the absolute power of alien-
ation in nubibus, then why not allow a Frantor or testator to
dispose of his property in such a menner as to suspend the power
of alienation for a period not exceeding twenty-one years? The
argument may be advanced that the as.-aFe of a la-7 permitting a
suspension for a term of years would tend to increase the number
of estates the absolute power of alienation of which would be in
abeyance, and that the effect upon business would be of a detri-
mental character. The correctness of the forcer part of the
argument will not admit of controversy, but "e the latter portion
I feel justified in declaring to be palpably erroneous. In what
possible manner could the suspension of the absolute power of
alienation for a short term of years, twenty-one or less, render
business stagnant? It would not seriously affect real estate
agents for the per song in oossession could convey7 t heir interest s,
and I 'elieve there would be as many titles in .he market for sale
or exchange as there are under thie present laws. The income and
profits of the land would have to be invested and th-s the finan-
cial world would have no cagse for complaint. In fact, the only
way that dealers in real property would be at all affected, and
that is only a possibility, lies in the oroposition that they
would not receive as much commissinn for the sale of a fractional
title as they might get for the sale of an absolute fee. But it
is also possible that with the increase in number of fractional
titles thepe would be a corresponding increase of sales, and the
income of real estate agents would suffer *iv chiange in arnolnt.
However, admitting that the law proposed would entail a
slight financial loss upon dealers in real estate, and I only
admit it for the sake of argiunent, when we consider the vast
anunt of rood that could be done by rendering the inaptly ex-
pressed, but philanthropic intentions of benevole!,t grantors and
testators effectual, the financial loss becomes insignificant in
compari son.
Having considered the question in its varied aspects and
plases, and realizing that the existing state of affairs will
bear an inestimable amount of improvement, also recognizing the
fact that extensive changes like the one suggested require lonp
periods of time for their complete consurration and accomplish-
me.nt, yet. feeling as I do, that the harvest of benefits which
would be reaped as a natural consequence of the proposed alter-
ation of the New York law against perpetuities, would be of such
vast magnitude as to render regret impossible, I a'peal to the
legislators of the great Empire State, the leader of her fellovs
in great legal reforms, to remedy the present deficiencies in
our statute.
Finis.

